]> 2026-04-25T14:30:08+00:00 674057892677591a7c897d6c 0 en Pleasure derived from contemplation is honest and most praiseworthy. However, when the mind deliberates about things to be done or avoided, and takes pleasure in the choice of such things, not all such pleasure is usually praised. That which arises from those plans and actions which oppose the best things is rightly blamed, as if the mind rejoices in a plan against the safety of one's country and parents, and against right. When it delights in honest actions, the pleasure is honest; but when in mediocre actions, the pleasure too is mediocre. Therefore, there is only one kind of joy, and that is worthy of praise. In the other, however, there are three kinds (as we have said): the honest, the shameful, and the mediocre. That argument which he uses in the tenth book on morals is also quite relevant to what we are discussing. For he says that we can contemplate longer than we can do anything else, and since the investigation of truth is firmer and more stable than any duty of action, it is necessary that the pleasure which arises from it should also be more stable and perfect. Add to this that the life of the wise man and contemplation requires fewer things than civic life; wherefore, since its pleasure is content with few and small things, it will undoubtedly be more self-sufficient and more perfect. Furthermore, that part of the mind to which we attribute contemplation is, as no one would deny, more perfect, and therefore brings a more excellent pleasure than all others. And while the active movements and agitations of the mind are directed toward something else to be chosen or rejected, the contemplation of the primary mind is content with itself, and desires nothing at all besides itself. Therefore, by necessary reasoning, the pleasure which is proper to contemplation is desired for its own sake alone. The other, however, seeks something besides itself as an end, and therefore the former is to be judged much more excellent. Added to this is the fact that the first and more perfect part of anything bears the name and function of the whole; from which it follows that since each of us is constituted of many parts, yet that which is assigned to contemplation, because it surpasses the others in dignity, almost encompasses the whole nature of man, and that is what man is, as Aristotle says; wherefore, its action is especially appropriate for us, and contains an inexpressible pleasure, for things more naturally related tend to bring greater pleasure. Last... https://book-translation-data.s3.amazonaws.com/7c3a7809-b179-49fb-b814-dfa2fe419290.jpg LIBER gatione contemplationeque fufcipitur voluptas honefta eft, ac laude digniffima. Cum vero mens altera de rebus agendis fugiendiſque de- liberat, gaudérque eiusmodi rerum electione, non omnis tamen vo- luptas illa laudari solet. Quæ ex his consiliis actionibusque, quæ gibus optimis aduerfantur, prouenit, merito vituperatur veluti si mens confilio contra patriæ, parentumque salutem, contraque ius fufce- pro gaudeat, cum honeftis actionibus delectatur, voluptas honesta est. cum vero mediis, illa quoque est media, quo sit, ut primam me- te unum duntaxat gaudii genus, idque laude dignum existat. In al- tera vero tria (ut diximus) genera, honestum, turpe ac medium repe- riantur. Cilla quoque ratio, qua ille in decimo de moribus uti- tur, non parum ad id, quo de agimus valet. diutius enim contem- plari nos inquit, quam aliud quid vis agere posse, cumque veritatis inquisitione firmior, stabiliorque, quam quodlibet agendi officium sit, necesse est eam quoque, quæ ex illa provenit voluptatem stabilio- rem, ac perfectiorem existere. Adde quod sapientis vita con- templatioque pauciorum quam civilis indiget, quapropter illius vo- luptas cum ipsa quoque paucis minimisque contenta sit, proculdu- bio magis ex se ipsa sufficiet, ac perfectior iudicabitur. CEft præ- terea pars ea mentis, cui natura contemplationem tribuimus, altera ut nemo, utique negaret, perfectior, proptereaque præstantiorem ca- teris omnibus voluptatem affert. Cumque actiua mentis mo- tus agitationeq; ad aliud quoddam, aut eligendum, aut reiciendum se- ratur, primæ vero mentis contemplatio se ipsa contenta sit, nec ali- ud omnino quicquam præter se ipsa desideret, necessaria ratione con- ficitur, voluptatem, quæ contemplationi propria est, sui duntaxat gratia desiderari. Alteram vero aliud præter se quiddam velut finem expetere, atque iccirco primam illam admodum præstantiorem iudi- candam esse. Accedit ad hæc, quod prima cuiufque pars atque perfectior, totiusquasi vicem appellationemque gerit, ex quo sequi- tur, ut cum hominum quisque pluribus ex partibus constitutus sit, ea tamen, quæ contemplationi deputata est, quia ceteris dignitate præ- stet integram pene naturam hominis complectatur, eaque maxime homo, ut Aristoteles inquit, existat, quamobrem, et illius actio nobis præcipue congruit, atque ineffabilem continet voluptatem, quare natura cognatiora sunt, maiorem unice voluptatem afferre solent. Postrema 2025-06-27T12:26:19Z 2460854.0182755 674057892677591a7c897d6c PageId 102 en PageId