6740572c2677591a7c897d62

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Property	Value
Uuid	6bd2d39b-ed02-5f7e-3269-afe3e89f13FAKEUUID
ItemId	674057212677591a7c897d60
PageId	6740572c2677591a7c897d62
Author	Iamblichus
Title	De Mysteriis
Pagenumber	1

Original Page:

Latin:

DE VOLUPTATE fecondationem, titillationemque, voluptatem esse iudicaverunt. Caput I. Opiniones peripateticorum de voluptate. Aristoteles autem horum nihil voluptatem nuncupare vide- tur. Cæterum apprehensionis ipsius quandam perfectionem, ut prior quidem dulcedinis perceptio sit, ex hac aliud quiddam nascatur eius quasi comes, et annexa perfectio, eademque voluptas exis- tat. Quid vero sit huiusmodi perfectio, quam voluptatem nominat, nun- quam (ut videtur) explicuit. Peripatetici autem, qui fluxerunt ab Aris- tote, dum id, quod ab eorum principe obscure dictum fuerat, explicare, et in lucem edere vellent, in diversas sunt sententias distributi. Nam alii quidem in sensibus, alii vero in eo, qui sensus sequitur appetitu volup- tatem collocavere. Et qui in sensibus, diversis quoque modis Aristo- telem interpretantur. Etenim non nulli duas in sensibus esse putant per- ceptiones, quarum prima ab iis, quae extrinsecus offeruntur in animum quodammodo proficisci, ac fluere videtur; altera vero ab animo magis profecta, ad ea, quae extra sunt porrigi. Primo nanque animus exempli gratia dulcedinem percipit, quae prima perceptio ex ipsius rei, quae ob- jecta est, suavitate oriri videtur. Deinde considerat se dulcedinem con- secutum fuisse, illam percipere, habere, eaque perfrui; atque hanc illam se- cundam animi perceptionem, seu cogitationem, sive meditationem, seu animadversionem, voluptatem appellatam esse ab Aristotele censuerunt, ut voluptas sit illa ipsa consideratio, qua bonorum praesentia se frui quis cogitát. Non nulli non sensum, cum se dulcedinem confecutum animadvertit offerri, et quasi erigi, et quadam velut hilaritatem conci- pere, ac per se ferre, eamque voluptatem ab Aristotele dicta arbitrantur. Itaque voluptatem esse elevationem, sive hilaritatem animi adepti iam illud, quod cupierat bonum. At vero qui voluptatem in ea parte animi, qua appetimus posuerunt, duas appetitus proprietates esse putant. Una quidem moveri nos ad eaque inclinari, quae procul a nobis sunt bona, nec dum illa fuerimus consecuti; altera vero in eo, quod adepti iam consecutique sumus, consistere. Primam cupiditatem, alteram, quietem nun- cupant; et illam quidem molestia, sollicitudine, cura, anxietate, plenam esse; voluptatem hanc vero ineffabili quadam suavitate perfusam, eamque vo- luptatem a peripateticorum principe nuncupari, ut nihil aliud volup- tatem fuerit, nisi terminus quidam, sive quies appetitus in bono, quod iam fuerit confecutus. Unde Lucretius, requies inquit hominum divumque voluptas. Cæterum quid ipsa quies sit, non eodem omnes modo

English:

ON PLEASURE

They judged fecundation and titillation to be pleasure.

Chapter I. The opinions of the Peripatetics on pleasure.

Aristotle, however, does not seem to call any of these things pleasure. Furthermore, he considers a certain perfection of apprehension itself, such that a perception of sweetness comes first, and from this something else arises as its companion and annexed perfection, and this same thing is pleasure. What this kind of perfection is, which he names pleasure, he never (it seems) explained. The Peripatetics, however, who flowed from Aristotle, while wishing to explain what had been obscurely said by their leader and to bring it to light, were distributed into various opinions. For some placed pleasure in the senses, others in that which follows the senses, namely appetite. And those who placed it in the senses also interpreted Aristotle in different ways. For some think that there are two perceptions in the senses, of which the first seems somehow to proceed and flow from those things which are offered from without into the mind; the other, however, proceeds more from the mind, and extends to those things which are outside. For first, for example, the mind perceives sweetness, which first perception seems to arise from the sweetness of the thing itself which is presented. Then it considers that it has obtained sweetness, that it perceives it, possesses it, and enjoys it; and this second perception, or thought, or meditation, or consideration of the mind, they judged to have been called pleasure by Aristotle, so that pleasure is that very consideration by which one thinks that one enjoys the presence of good things. Some do not think it is the sense, when it perceives that sweetness is obtained, and as it were is raised up and conceives a certain kind of joy, and bears it of itself, and they think that this was called pleasure by Aristotle. Therefore pleasure is an elevation, or joy of mind having already obtained that good which it desired. But those who placed pleasure in that part of the mind by which we desire, think that there are two properties of appetite. One is that we are moved and inclined towards those good things which are far from us, and we have not yet obtained them; the other consists in that which we have already obtained. They call the first desire, the second rest; and they say that the former is full of trouble, anxiety, care, and worry; but the latter is infused with an ineffable sweetness, and they say that this was called pleasure by the leader of the Peripatetics, so that pleasure was nothing other than a certain end, or rest of appetite in a good which has already been obtained. Whence Lucretius says, "Rest," he says, "is the pleasure of men and gods." But what rest itself is, not all agree in the same way...