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fecondationem, titillationemque, voluptatem esse iudicaverunt. Caput I. Opiniones peripateticorum de voluptate. Aristoteles autem horum nihil voluptatem nuncupare vide- tur. Cæterum apprehensionis ipsius quandam perfectionem, ut prior quidem dulcedinis perceptio sit, ex hac aliud quiddam nascatur eius quasi comes, et annexa perfectio, eademque voluptas exis- tat. Quid vero sit huiusmodi perfectio, quam voluptatem nominat, nun- quam (ut videtur) explicuit. Peripatetici autem, qui fluxerunt ab Aris- tote, dum id, quod ab eorum principe obscure dictum fuerat, explicare, et in lucem edere vellent, in diversas sunt sententias distributi. Nam alii quidem in sensibus, alii vero in eo, qui sensus sequitur appetitu volup- tatem collocavere. Et qui in sensibus, diversis quoque modis Aristo- telem interpretantur. Etenim non nulli duas in sensibus esse putant per- ceptiones, quarum prima ab iis, quae extrinsecus offeruntur in animum quodammodo proficisci, ac fluere videtur; altera vero ab animo magis profecta, ad ea, quae extra sunt porrigi. Primo nanque animus exempli gratia dulcedinem percipit, quae prima perceptio ex ipsius rei, quae ob- jecta est, suavitate oriri videtur. Deinde considerat se dulcedinem con- secutum fuisse, illam percipere, habere, eaque perfrui; atque hanc illam se- cundam animi perceptionem, seu cogitationem, sive meditationem, seu animadversionem, voluptatem appellatam esse ab Aristotele censuerunt, ut voluptas sit illa ipsa consideratio, qua bonorum praesentia se frui quis cogitát. Non nulli non sensum, cum se dulcedinem confecutum animadvertit offerri, et quasi erigi, et quadam velut hilaritatem conci- pere, ac per se ferre, eamque voluptatem ab Aristotele dicta arbitrantur. Itaque voluptatem esse elevationem, sive hilaritatem animi adepti iam illud, quod cupierat bonum. At vero qui voluptatem in ea parte animi, qua appetimus posuerunt, duas appetitus proprietates esse putant. Una quidem moveri nos ad eaque inclinari, quae procul a nobis sunt bona, nec dum illa fuerimus consecuti; altera vero in eo, quod adepti iam consecutique sumus, consistere. Primam cupiditatem, alteram, quietem nun- cupant; et illam quidem molestia, sollicitudine, cura, anxietate, plenam esse; voluptatem hanc vero ineffabili quadam suavitate perfusam, eamque vo- luptatem a peripateticorum principe nuncupari, ut nihil aliud volup- tatem fuerit, nisi terminus quidam, sive quies appetitus in bono, quod iam fuerit confecutus. Unde Lucretius, requies inquit hominum divumque voluptas. Cæterum quid ipsa quies sit, non eodem omnes modo | ON PLEASURE
They judged fecundation and titillation to be pleasure. Chapter I. The opinions of the Peripatetics on pleasure. Aristotle, however, does not seem to call any of these things pleasure. Furthermore, he considers a certain perfection of apprehension itself, such that a perception of sweetness comes first, and from this something else arises as its companion and annexed perfection, and this same thing is pleasure. What this kind of perfection is, which he names pleasure, he never (it seems) explained. The Peripatetics, however, who flowed from Aristotle, while wishing to explain what had been obscurely said by their leader and to bring it to light, were distributed into various opinions. For some placed pleasure in the senses, others in that which follows the senses, namely appetite. And those who placed it in the senses also interpreted Aristotle in different ways. For some think that there are two perceptions in the senses, of which the first seems somehow to proceed and flow from those things which are offered from without into the mind; the other, however, proceeds more from the mind, and extends to those things which are outside. For first, for example, the mind perceives sweetness, which first perception seems to arise from the sweetness of the thing itself which is presented. Then it considers that it has obtained sweetness, that it perceives it, possesses it, and enjoys it; and this second perception, or thought, or meditation, or consideration of the mind, they judged to have been called pleasure by Aristotle, so that pleasure is that very consideration by which one thinks that one enjoys the presence of good things. Some do not think it is the sense, when it perceives that sweetness is obtained, and as it were is raised up and conceives a certain kind of joy, and bears it of itself, and they think that this was called pleasure by Aristotle. Therefore pleasure is an elevation, or joy of mind having already obtained that good which it desired. But those who placed pleasure in that part of the mind by which we desire, think that there are two properties of appetite. One is that we are moved and inclined towards those good things which are far from us, and we have not yet obtained them; the other consists in that which we have already obtained. They call the first desire, the second rest; and they say that the former is full of trouble, anxiety, care, and worry; but the latter is infused with an ineffable sweetness, and they say that this was called pleasure by the leader of the Peripatetics, so that pleasure was nothing other than a certain end, or rest of appetite in a good which has already been obtained. Whence Lucretius says, "Rest," he says, "is the pleasure of men and gods." But what rest itself is, not all agree in the same way... | 1 |
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expofuerunt. Aliinanque ceffationem ipfam, acueluti finem aliquem appetendi quietem definiunt. Appetitum et enim cum id,quod cupie rat bonum adeptus fuerit, ab appetendo defiftere.Itaque follicitudine et anxietate uacare, quæ uacatio quies ipfa fit, eademque uoluptasab Arifto tele nuncupata Ideoque uoluptas eft, ut ifti definiút, acquifito, quod cu pitum fuerat bono, ab omni appetendi follicitudine et anxietate uaca tio. Non nulli uero peripatetici aliquid huic uacationi aliud ad- diderunt.Carere quippe omni moleftia non dum plenam, ac perfectă uoluptatis naturam poflidere Fieri uero integram, atque abfolutam fi in eo ipfo ftatu ficomnisappetitio conquiefcat, ut non modo non ulte rius appetat quippiam, fed huic,quo fruitur bono totis neruis, ac uiri bushæreat, affentiatur fibi effe fatis,atque í id penitus diffundatur Efter igo, ut cenfent ifti, uoluptas affenfio, atque diffufio appetitus in id, quod poffideatbonum, quo fitut mediisin uoluptatibus liquefcere corpusto tum,ac diffuere uideatur. cum omnis animi, corporífq; uis, ac motus in id, quod extrinfecusobiicitur,inclinetur, ac penitusrapiatur. Eiufce- modi uero diffufio non modo in corporismembris partibufque.uerú etiam in appetitu naturaque animi efle debet neque enim i rem aliquă corpus nifi appetitus i pulfu animique poteftate diffunditur Quapro- pter etipfum quoque appetitum animumque diffundi necefle eft,atq; auidiflime affigi,et hærere illi, quod propriæ uideatur naturæ cógruere. Omnisigitur huiufmodi animi, appetituſquenixus,copulandı,hærédi affigendi ei, quod iam poffidetur bono uoluptatem continet, nec aliud quicquam, ut illis placer, uoluptaseffe uidetur, nifi aflentiri, hærere, affi gipræfenti bono, o,in id que difluere, penituſque diffundi-modo hæcin- telligasin animo,in eaque animi parte, quæappetendi iuis nominata eft fieri-Nam huiufmodi motus in calore quoque fanguine, ſpiritibus, to toque corpore reperitur, qui nec tamen uoluptaseft, nec parsaliqua uo luptatis.uerum ab ea,quæ in animo eft diffufione, affenfioneque, quam uoluptatem dicuntalla quoque corporis liquefactio, effufioque ueluti ueftigia quædam intima uoluptatis proficifcunt.Ná qualia hæcin cor pore funt,talis et in animo uoluptas exiftit. Caput.vii.Que platonicorum cum ariftotelicis concordia, et quid Pla to de fenfibus, et affectibus, Aec eftigitur peripateticorum de uoluptatis definitióe fen- tentia, quam ipfearbitror, ne minima quidem in partea Pla- tonis | They have expounded. And they define that very cessation, as it were, some end of appeasing quiet. For appetite also, when it has obtained the good thing which it desired, ceases from desiring. Therefore, to be free from solicitude and anxiety, which freedom is quiet itself, and the same pleasure called by Aristotle. Therefore, pleasure is, as they define it, freedom from all the solicitude and anxiety of desiring, when the good thing which was desired has been acquired. However, some Peripatetics added something else to this freedom. For to be free from all trouble does not yet possess the full and perfect nature of pleasure. However, it becomes whole and complete if in that very state all appetite rests, so that not only does it not further desire anything, but it clings to this good which it enjoys with all its strength and power, agrees that it is enough for itself, and this is thoroughly diffused. Therefore, as these people think, pleasure is the agreement and diffusion of appetite in the good which it possesses, so that the body seems to melt and diffuse itself as a mediator in pleasures, when all the force and motion of mind and body is inclined and thoroughly carried away to that which is presented from without. Such diffusion, however, ought to be not only in the members and parts of the body, but also in the nature of appetite and mind; for the body is not diffused into some thing except by the power of appetite and mind's impulse. Wherefore, it is necessary that appetite and mind themselves also be diffused, and most eagerly fixed and adhere to that which seems to agree with its own nature. Therefore, all such striving, coupling, adhering, and fixing of mind and appetite to the good which is already possessed contains pleasure, and nothing else seems to be pleasure to them, except to agree, adhere, and be fixed to the present good, and to flow into it and be thoroughly diffused—only let this be understood to take place in the mind, and in that part of the mind which is called the faculty of appetite. For such motion is found also in warm blood, spirits, and the whole body, which is nevertheless not pleasure, nor a part of pleasure; but from that diffusion and agreement which is in the mind, which they call pleasure, all the liquefaction and effusion of the body proceeds as certain intimate traces of pleasure. For as these things are in the body, so pleasure exists in the mind.
Chapter VII. What concord of the Platonists with the Aristotelians, and what Plato says about senses and affections. This, therefore, is the opinion of the Peripatetics concerning the definition of pleasure, which I myself believe does not differ in the slightest part from Plato's. | 2 |
 | DE VOLUPTATE tonis nostri sententia discrepare, nisi quod Aristoteles latius loquitur eodem nomine voluptatis, et eam, quae in mente est, iocunditatem,et eam quae in sensibus nominans. Plato vero voluptatem vocat eam, quae sensibus accidit.quod vero in mente est, id gaudium nuncupat. Quinetiam interdum et ipse Plato voluptatis et gaudii nomina confundit, utroque vocabulo utens ad utrunque significandum. Nomine igitur vel nullo modo, vel vix, ac minimo discrepant, ex vero re congruunt testes esse possunt non nulli Platonis libri, nec non Platonici plerique haudquaquam philosophica contemnendi. Nam Apuleius, Calcidius, Contius, Ptolemaei Platonici nobiles eo, quem breuiter referam, modo Platonis sententiam obscurissimam in Timco verbis positam, interpretantur. sensum profecto aiunt a Platone primam animi perceptionem, quae ab ipsa corporis passione nascatur, intelligi. Et enim rerum omnium, quae noscendae sunt, species quasdam ad nos fluere, sensuum foraminibus hauriri in eo, qui in cerebri ventriculis est, spiritu imprimi, atque consignari. eiusmodi rerum species in spiritu, quod quidem corpus est tenuissumum, atque perlucidum figuratas pullare animum, atque efficere, ut illa ipsa obiecta externa, quorum hae sunt imagines intuetur, atque percipiat. hanc animi perceptionem ab ipsa corporis passione impulsionesque nasci uidemus spiritus siquidem ab externis motis corporibus, ipse animum simili pulsat, formatque imagine. Cum igitur eiusmodi perceptio a spiritus impulsione nascatur, consequens est eam a corporis passione, idet pulsu motioneque proficisci, quod imitatus Aurelius Augustinus Platonicus bonus in eo libro, qui de animi quantitate scribitur. sensus est, inquit, passio corporis per se ipsam nolens animam, idet per ipsam corporis speciem sensibus haustem eiusdem quoque passionem corporis, prima quadam, et propria imagine percipi. Ex quibus fit, ut gemina corporis passione sentiamus. Nam cerebri spirituque impulsionem externorum corporum passiones apprehe dimus. Passionem vero illam, quam corpus proprium extrinsecus accepit, Platonici bifariam dividunt, quarum una leniat corpus, ac mulceat, nec tamen membra, visceraque pulset, quam palpet, atque titillet altera vero asperius, ac durius agitet. Cum vero animus primae illi corporis motioni, cuius mulcere proprium est, consentiat, voluptatem fieri. cum ab altera, quam asperam dicimus, abhorreat, atque defciscat, dolorem afferunt. Assentitur autem animus corporis motioni, cum ei libenter adhaeret, affigitur, copulatur, perfunditurque in ea suavissime con | ON PLEASURE Our opinion differs from that of Aristotle, except that Aristotle speaks more broadly with the same name of pleasure, naming both the pleasure that is in the mind and that which is in the senses. Plato, however, calls pleasure that which happens to the senses. What is in the mind he calls joy. Indeed, sometimes Plato himself confuses the names of pleasure and joy, using both words to signify both. Therefore, they differ in name either not at all, or hardly at all, and minimally; in reality, however, several of Plato's books, and also many Platonists not at all to be despised philosophically, can be witnesses to their agreement. For Apuleius, Chalcidius, and Contius, notable Platonists of Ptolemy, interpret Plato's most obscurely stated opinion in the *Timaeus* in the way I shall briefly relate. They say, in fact, that by Plato the first perception of the mind is understood, which arises from the very passion of the body. And indeed, they say that species of all things which are to be known flow to us, are drawn in through the openings of the senses, are imprinted upon and fixed in the spirit which is in the ventricles of the brain. These kinds of species of things, figured in the spirit, which is indeed a most thin and transparent body, attract the mind and cause it to gaze upon and perceive those very external objects of which these are images. We see this perception of the mind arising from the very impulse and passion of the body; for the spirit itself, moved by external bodies, strikes the mind similarly and shapes it into an image. Therefore, since such perception arises from the impulse of the spirit, it follows that it proceeds from the passion, impulse, and motion of the body, which the good Platonist Aurelius Augustine imitated in that book which is written *On the Quantity of the Soul*. “Sensation,” he says, “is the passion of the body itself unwillingly affecting the soul; therefore, by the very species of the body drawn in by the senses, it perceives the same passion of the body also, by a certain first and proper image.” From which it happens that we feel a twofold passion of the body. For we apprehend the impulses of the brain and spirit, passions of external bodies. This passion, however, which the body itself receives from without, the Platonists divide into two kinds: one softens and soothes the body, and yet does not strike, touch, or tickle the limbs and viscera; the other, however, moves more harshly and roughly. When the mind agrees with that first motion of the body, whose property it is to soothe, pleasure is produced. When it recoils and shrinks from the other, which we call harsh, it produces pain. The mind, however, agrees with the motion of the body when it willingly adheres to it, is fixed to it, is joined to it, and is most sweetly poured into it. | 3 |
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quiefcit Quapropter Aurelius Augustinus voluptate definit appe- titionis ipfius cum eo, quod amauerit unionem. Non ne et hoc idem pe- ripatetici voluptate fuperius definire, requiefcere animum, per- fundi, ac penitus copulari. Quid ergo restat, cur non dicantur Plato- nici, peripateticique unum, atque idem de voluptate, et dicere pariter, et sentire? Quo alio discrepant, nisi illi consentire animum, isti quie- scere, ac silere dicunt. Immo et ob hoc nihilo discrepant; necenim quie- scit animus unquam, nisi consentiat, nec consentit quidem, nisi pariter et quiescat. Caput viii-Quomo peripatetici dividunt voluptate, et de duobus aiz. 9 Vid ergo Platonici ac peripatetici de voluptatis definitione ne tradiderint, et quemadmodum in idem utrorumque di- sputationes conveniant, fatis iam arbitror declaratum. Quod uero de voluptatis divisione peripatetici senserint exequamur. Om- nem peripatetici naturam hominis ex anima constare putant, et cor- pore. Animam vero in duas partes, ut ad propositam questionem perti- net, mentem uidelicet, sensumque distribui. Rursusque mentem vim pariter geminam, naturamque habere. Earum profecto unam in verita- tis indagatione, alteram in consultatione, et actione versari, atque illum (uteorum verbis utar) contemplativum intellectum, hunc activum no- minant. Illius proprium esse rerum earum, quae naturae ordine conti- nentur, causas, proprietates, progressusque perquirere. Solaque veritatis contemplatione contentum esse. Huius autem opus dici volunt, quae agenda, fugienda velint, consulando discernere. Sensium vero alios quidem intimos, externos alios vocant. Intimos (ut vult Averroes peripa- teticorum interpretum acutissimus) quatuor in species dividunt, quo- rum primus omnes, quae per externos quinque sensus hauriuntur ima- gines colligat, atque percipiat, ob idque communem sensum appellant. Al- tera deinde vis imaginandi ab iis nuncupata est, cuius officium sit, cum ipse nihil per se fingat imagines, quae a prioribus sensibus acceptae sunt, retinere, easque tertiae sentiendi naturae, cui illi phantasiam, existiman- dique, ac cogitandi vim dicunt, afferre, cuius opus esse arbitrantur, ut iis acceptis imaginibus, quid aut quale sit id cuius illae imagines sint, iudicet, atque percipiat, eaque ipsa, quae discreverit, sive conjunxerit, seu concepta judicando, postremam cerebri ipsius, sensusque particulae, quam memoriam dicunt, servanda commendat. Sensus vero illos ex- ternos | BOOK
It rests. Therefore, Augustine defines pleasure as the union with that which one has loved. Do not the Peripatetics also define pleasure similarly above, as the quieting of the mind, its being filled, and thoroughly united? What then remains, why are not the Platonists and Peripatetics said to be one and the same concerning pleasure, and to say and feel alike? In what else do they differ, except that those say the mind consents, these that it rests and is silent? Indeed, on this account they do not differ at all; for the mind never rests unless it consents, nor does it consent unless it also rests. Chapter VIII—How the Peripatetics divide pleasure, and concerning two principles. 9. Therefore, I think it has been sufficiently shown how the Platonists and Peripatetics have handed down the definition of pleasure, and how the arguments of both agree on the same thing. However, let us explain what the Peripatetics thought about the division of pleasure. All Peripatetics think that human nature consists of soul and body. They divide the soul, however, into two parts, insofar as it pertains to the proposed question, namely, mind and sense. And again, they say the mind has a twofold power and nature. Of these, one indeed is occupied with the investigation of truth, the other with deliberation and action, and they call the former (to use their words) the contemplative intellect, the latter the active. The property of the former is to seek out the causes, properties, and progress of those things which are contained in the order of nature. And it is content only with the contemplation of truth. But they say the work of the latter is, by deliberation, to discern what should be done or avoided. They call certain senses internal, others external. The internal (as Averroes, the most acute of the interpreters of the Peripatetics, wishes), they divide into four species, of which the first collects and perceives all the images which are drawn in through the five external senses, and on this account they call it the common sense. Then a second power of imagining is called by them, whose office it is, since it itself fashions nothing by itself, to retain the images which have been received from the prior senses, and to bring them to a third nature of feeling, which they call imagination, the power of thinking and considering, whose work they judge to be that, having received these images, it judges and perceives what or of what kind that is of which those images are, and it commits to the keeping of the last part of the brain itself and of the sense, which they call memory, those things which it has separated or joined together, or conceived by judging. The external senses however... | 4 |
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ternos qui ad id, quod quærimus magis ualent, quinque in species, quæ cunctis notae sunt, dividunt, eosque sic inuicem se habere purerent, ut qui eminentiorem corporis locum possident, puriores simplicio- resque sint. Reliqui crassiores. Ideoque visum auditu, hunc odora- tu, odorandi vero vim gustu, hunc denique tactu puriorem videri. Nam ad visum lux, atque colores, Ad aures soni, ad nares odores. Sa- pores ad gustum, soliditas vero, ac mollicies, calorque, et frigus ad tangendi vim pertinent. Quapropter quo lux, colorque sono, sonus odoribus, hi vero sapore. Sapores autem iis, quae tactui subiciun- tur puriores exsistunt, eo visus auditui, hic narium sensui. Sensu hic gustui, gustus denique tactui, puritate, dignitateque praestant, His autem quinque viribus sentiendi, quinque pariter in corpore (ut illi vocant) organa atque subiecta, et quasi fundamenta quaedam at- tribuuntur. Nec aliud quicquam haec esse uidentur, nisi corporis quae- dam affectiones, quas alii dispositiones, alii qualitates, non nulli com- plexiones nominant, quae elementorum varia commixtione diver- sis in partibus corporis diversa nascuntur, ac sunt diversorum quoque sensuum fundamenta. Alia nanque corporis affectio est, qua viden- di potestas sustinetur, ac viget. Alia vero qua audiendi, idemque est dereliquis omnibus iudicandum praeter has quinque seu affectiones, sive subiecta, quinque pariter instrumenta, solidioraque corporis mem- bra, quibus tum sensus, tum etiam affectiones ipsi inhaereant, velut receptacula quaedam adinventa, constitutaque sunt. oculi nanque vasculorum inftar affectionem vimque videndi recipiunt, ceteraque, ut perspicuum est, corporis membra certo quodam ordine ceteris qua- litatibus, ac sensibus assignantur. His praeterea membris, instrumen- tisque proprii quidam motus, qui cuiusque affectum intimum de- monstrare uidentur, innati sunt. Itaque in ipsis animi perturbationi- bus, modo rubescere, modo pallere, et alias quidem contrahi, ac rigere, alias vero diffluere, et quasi liquefcere cernimus. omnia, quae longo iam ordine dinumeravimus voluptate, ita hac CAd hac tinere Aristoteles arbitratur, ut in ea mente, quam contemplativam appellat, perfecta quaedam atque absoluta voluptas infit. In caeteris de- inde hominis partibus gradatim degeneret. Nam septem (ut putat) de caussis, prima illa voluptas, altera quae in activa mente ponitur, volu- ptate perfectior esse videtur. Omnis enim, quae ex veritatis inda Z iii | Concerning Pleasure
Those who are more capable of understanding what we seek divide it into five categories, which are known to all, and they maintain that these are related to each other in such a way that those which occupy a more prominent place in the body are purer and simpler. The others are coarser. Therefore, sight is considered purer than hearing, hearing than smell, smell than taste, and taste than touch. For light and colors pertain to sight, sounds to hearing, odors to the nose. Flavors pertain to taste, solidity and softness, warmth and cold pertain to the sense of touch. Therefore, light and color surpass sound, sound surpasses odors, and these in turn surpass flavor. Flavors, however, surpass those things which are subject to touch, just as sight surpasses hearing, and hearing surpasses the sense of smell. Sight surpasses taste, and taste surpasses touch in purity and dignity. To these five powers of sensation, five corresponding organs and underlying structures, and as it were, certain foundations are attributed in the body (as they call it). Nor do these seem to be anything other than certain affections of the body, which some call dispositions, others qualities, and some complexions, which arise from a varied mixture of elements in different parts of the body, and are also the foundations of different senses. For one affection of the body is that by which the power of seeing is sustained and thrives. Another is that by which the power of hearing is sustained, and the same judgment must be made of all the rest besides these five affections or underlying structures. Five instruments, and stronger members of the body, to which both senses and affections themselves adhere, as it were certain receptacles invented and established, are equally present. For the eyes, like little vessels, receive the affection and power of sight, and the other members of the body, as is clear, are assigned to other qualities and senses in a certain order. Furthermore, these members and instruments have certain innate motions which seem to demonstrate the intimate affection of each. And so, in the very disturbances of the mind, we see people sometimes blush, sometimes turn pale, and sometimes contract and stiffen, while at other times they relax and, as it were, liquefy. Aristotle believes that all the things we have enumerated in a long list hold to pleasure in this way: that in what he calls the contemplative mind, a certain perfect and absolute pleasure resides. Then, it gradually degenerates in the other parts of man. For (as he thinks) of the seven causes, that first pleasure, and the second which is placed in the active mind, seems to be more perfect pleasure. For every pleasure which arises from truth… | 5 |
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gatione contemplationeque fufcipitur voluptas honefta eft, ac laude digniffima. Cum vero mens altera de rebus agendis fugiendiſque de- liberat, gaudérque eiusmodi rerum electione, non omnis tamen vo- luptas illa laudari solet. Quæ ex his consiliis actionibusque, quæ gibus optimis aduerfantur, prouenit, merito vituperatur veluti si mens confilio contra patriæ, parentumque salutem, contraque ius fufce- pro gaudeat, cum honeftis actionibus delectatur, voluptas honesta est. cum vero mediis, illa quoque est media, quo sit, ut primam me- te unum duntaxat gaudii genus, idque laude dignum existat. In al- tera vero tria (ut diximus) genera, honestum, turpe ac medium repe- riantur. Cilla quoque ratio, qua ille in decimo de moribus uti- tur, non parum ad id, quo de agimus valet. diutius enim contem- plari nos inquit, quam aliud quid vis agere posse, cumque veritatis inquisitione firmior, stabiliorque, quam quodlibet agendi officium sit, necesse est eam quoque, quæ ex illa provenit voluptatem stabilio- rem, ac perfectiorem existere. Adde quod sapientis vita con- templatioque pauciorum quam civilis indiget, quapropter illius vo- luptas cum ipsa quoque paucis minimisque contenta sit, proculdu- bio magis ex se ipsa sufficiet, ac perfectior iudicabitur. CEft præ- terea pars ea mentis, cui natura contemplationem tribuimus, altera ut nemo, utique negaret, perfectior, proptereaque præstantiorem ca- teris omnibus voluptatem affert. Cumque actiua mentis mo- tus agitationeq; ad aliud quoddam, aut eligendum, aut reiciendum se- ratur, primæ vero mentis contemplatio se ipsa contenta sit, nec ali- ud omnino quicquam præter se ipsa desideret, necessaria ratione con- ficitur, voluptatem, quæ contemplationi propria est, sui duntaxat gratia desiderari. Alteram vero aliud præter se quiddam velut finem expetere, atque iccirco primam illam admodum præstantiorem iudi- candam esse. Accedit ad hæc, quod prima cuiufque pars atque perfectior, totiusquasi vicem appellationemque gerit, ex quo sequi- tur, ut cum hominum quisque pluribus ex partibus constitutus sit, ea tamen, quæ contemplationi deputata est, quia ceteris dignitate præ- stet integram pene naturam hominis complectatur, eaque maxime homo, ut Aristoteles inquit, existat, quamobrem, et illius actio nobis præcipue congruit, atque ineffabilem continet voluptatem, quare natura cognatiora sunt, maiorem unice voluptatem afferre solent. Postrema | Pleasure derived from contemplation is honest and most praiseworthy. However, when the mind deliberates about things to be done or avoided, and takes pleasure in the choice of such things, not all such pleasure is usually praised. That which arises from those plans and actions which oppose the best things is rightly blamed, as if the mind rejoices in a plan against the safety of one's country and parents, and against right. When it delights in honest actions, the pleasure is honest; but when in mediocre actions, the pleasure too is mediocre. Therefore, there is only one kind of joy, and that is worthy of praise. In the other, however, there are three kinds (as we have said): the honest, the shameful, and the mediocre. That argument which he uses in the tenth book on morals is also quite relevant to what we are discussing. For he says that we can contemplate longer than we can do anything else, and since the investigation of truth is firmer and more stable than any duty of action, it is necessary that the pleasure which arises from it should also be more stable and perfect. Add to this that the life of the wise man and contemplation requires fewer things than civic life; wherefore, since its pleasure is content with few and small things, it will undoubtedly be more self-sufficient and more perfect. Furthermore, that part of the mind to which we attribute contemplation is, as no one would deny, more perfect, and therefore brings a more excellent pleasure than all others. And while the active movements and agitations of the mind are directed toward something else to be chosen or rejected, the contemplation of the primary mind is content with itself, and desires nothing at all besides itself. Therefore, by necessary reasoning, the pleasure which is proper to contemplation is desired for its own sake alone. The other, however, seeks something besides itself as an end, and therefore the former is to be judged much more excellent. Added to this is the fact that the first and more perfect part of anything bears the name and function of the whole; from which it follows that since each of us is constituted of many parts, yet that which is assigned to contemplation, because it surpasses the others in dignity, almost encompasses the whole nature of man, and that is what man is, as Aristotle says; wherefore, its action is especially appropriate for us, and contains an inexpressible pleasure, for things more naturally related tend to bring greater pleasure. Last... | 6 |
 | DE VOLUPTATE Poftrema uero Ariftotelis argumentatio probat, propriam immortallium deorum operationem in sola contemplatione consistere ideoque neque quicquam in nobis praeter primam (ut diximus) mentem contemplationemque, atque eam, quae ex illa oritur, voluptatem, quod deo cognatum sit, inesse videtur, quod si voluptas huiusmodi, quia sola quis immortalibus convenit, maxime divina est, reliquis omnibus voluptatibus praestantior merito judicabitur. His igitur argumentationibus, ut contemplationis voluptatem illi quae agendo percipitur, anteponeret, Aristoteles utebatur verum ad eas iam, quae quasi titillant sensus, et ad eos suavitate quadam affluunt, atque illabuntur, deveniamus. Has in duas ab Aristotele species divisas comperimus, ex quibus aliae quidem naturales, aliae contra naturam esse videntur atque naturales eas vocat, quae cum naturam reficiant ab omnibus, aut pluribus appetuntur, atque pari quoque numero bifariam dividit, quarum aliae cunctis animalibus aequae communes sunt, aliae vero singulis pro diversitate naturae quodammodo propriae, atque cognatae. Namque quod cibum cuncta, potumque, ac veneris usum expetunt, communis naturalisque libidinis, ac voluptatis est proprium, quod autem singula pro naturae diversitate singulis, certisque rebus varie delectantur, aliique alia gratiora contingunt, id naturali quidem attamen propriae voluptati competit. Nam cum id voluptatum cuique, quod eius naturae congruat, videatur, diversaeque sint diversorum animalium affectiones, atque naturae, necesse est differentibus animalibus ea quoque, quae congruant discrepare. Atque iccirco certam, et quasi propriam singulis animalibus cupiditatem (ut inquit Heraclitus) voluptatemque competere. Delectat enim quenque, quod naturae suae sit aptum, trahit sua quenque voluptas. Atque hae sunt, quas naturales appellat contra naturam vero eas esse vult, a quibus universum pene hominum genus abhorret easque in tria dividit genera. Alias enim flagitiosa quadam corruptaque natura, alias consuetudine pessima, non nullas morbis, adversisque casibus evenire perversitate vero naturae contigisse scribit Aristoteles, ut mulier quaedam praegrantium viscera rescindere, puerosque vorare ardentissime niteretur, vel quod de efferatis quibusdam gentibus circa Pontum ferunt. Alios enim crudis, alios humanis carnibus delectari, non nullos tradere natos inuicem, ut in conviviis comedantur. Troglodytas vero serpentinis carnibus vesci. Diuturna quoque consuetudine plerisque contingit, ut pilorum euulsione, aut unguium esu | Aristotle's final argument proves that the proper activity of the immortal gods consists solely in contemplation; and therefore, it seems that in us there is nothing besides the first (as we have said) mind and contemplation, and the pleasure arising from it, which is akin to God. If this kind of pleasure, because it alone is fitting for the immortals, is supremely divine, it will rightly be judged superior to all other pleasures. Therefore, Aristotle used these arguments to place the pleasure of contemplation above that which is perceived through action. But let us now turn to those pleasures which, as it were, tickle the senses and flow into and penetrate them with a certain sweetness. We find these divided by Aristotle into two kinds, of which some seem to be natural, others contrary to nature. He calls those natural which, because they restore nature, are desired by all or most, and he divides these in two ways into equal numbers. Some are common to all animals, others are somehow proper and related to individuals according to the diversity of nature. For the fact that all things desire food, drink, and the use of Venus is the property of a common and natural desire and pleasure; but that individual things delight in various things according to the diversity of nature, and that some things are more pleasing to some than to others, pertains to a natural, yet proper pleasure. For since that pleasure seems suitable to each thing which accords with its nature, and since the affections and natures of different animals are diverse, it is necessary that those things which are suitable to different animals should also differ. And therefore, a certain and, as it were, proper desire and pleasure belongs to individual animals (as Heraclitus says). For each thing delights in that which is suited to its nature; each thing is drawn by its own pleasure. And these are what he calls natural. He believes, however, that those are contrary to nature from which almost the whole human race recoils, and he divides these into three kinds. For some result from a certain wicked and corrupt nature, others from the worst habit, and some from diseases and adverse circumstances. Aristotle writes that perversity of nature has also occurred, such as a certain woman striving eagerly to tear out the entrails of pregnant women and devour children, or what is reported about certain savage tribes around the Pontus. For some delight in raw flesh, others in human flesh, and some hand over their newborns to be eaten at feasts. The Troglodytes, however, are said to feed on serpents. Also, through long habit it happens to many that they are pleased by pulling out hairs or eating nails. | 7 |
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delectentur. Sæpe etiam, aut animi, aut corporis morbis id evenit, ut ille, qui matrem immolauit, comeditque et qui partibus ac filia cir- nibus, ut vefceretur utrunque decoxit, quique conferuijecit arden- ter concupiuit, eoque interfecto fumma cum voluptate vorauit. Nos quoque vidimus certo corporis morbo affectos, alios quidem lapillos, alios gypfum, non nullos terram, quofdam carbones, alios calcem, ut prægnantibus fæpe accidit, dentibus avidiffime refere. Tria hæc contra naturam genera voluptate, non humani fed ferini im- maniſque effe putat ingenii, unde ejufmodi voluptates, in eo, qui de moribus infcribitur feptimus, immanes appellat. Ex his quæ hactenus numerauimus, tria effe videntur apud Ariftotelem genera voluptate. prima quidem in contemplatione, altera vero in con- fultatione, atque actione verfat, et utrunque fane in mente, fed di- verfo quodam (ut diximus) modo confiftunt, tertiam deinde in fen- fibus pofiuimus, eamque in duas diftribuimus fpecies, naturalem fci- licet, et contra naturam. naturalium vero alteram communem, al- teram propriam nuncupamus. immanium præterea unam cor- rupta, flagitiofáque natura, alteram vitiofa confuetudine, tertiam mor- bis contingere. primam igitur, quæ ex contemplatione nafcitur vo- luptatem,quod deo fimillima fit, quodque non, ut homines, fed ut dii fumus, nobis contingat, divinam vocat, eam vero, quæ actio- nentis eft propria, honeftam fane, non tamen divinam nominat-eft enim honeftas non ipfa quidem divinitas,fed perfectum quoddam divinitatis fimulacrum, atque imago. unde fecunda mens, atque vo- luptas à prima degenerat, quod primæ divinitas, alteri vero divinita- tis fimulacrum tribuatur. Quæ autem corpus deliniunt, volupta- tes, nec divinitatis amplius, nihilóque magis honeftatis participes efle queunt quippe cum honeftas folius mentis decor, pulchritudo, atque ornatus exiftat, atque hic ornatus partiumque omnium convenien- tia in mentis habitu honeftas, in affectibus moderatio, in actioni- bus modeftia, in operibus ordo, in corpore forma à plerifque plato- nicis appellatur, habent tamen et ipfæ, quæ fenfus movent volupta- tes exiguam quandam honeftatis imaginem. Quæ enim ex iis men- tis rationifque legibus obfequuntur, ob eamque caufam moderatæ fi- unt, ob hanc ipfam moderationem honefti, atque decoris naturam imitari videntur. cumque honefti appellatione haud omnino digne fint, boni vocabulo ab Ariftotelicis appellantur atque effrenatiores, minufque | BOOK Let them delight. Often also, either by diseases of the mind or body, it happens that he who sacrificed his mother, and ate her, and he who boiled his daughter and her parts in order to eat both, and who ardently desired to devour his attendant, and having killed him devoured him with the greatest pleasure. We also have seen those affected by a certain bodily disease, some indeed crave pebbles, others gypsum, some earth, some charcoal, others lime, as often happens to pregnant women, who crave teeth most eagerly. He considers these three unnatural kinds of pleasure to be not of human but of savage and brutal nature, whence such pleasures are called monstrous in the seventh book, which is inscribed on morals. From those which we have enumerated so far, there seem to be three kinds of pleasure in Aristotle. The first indeed is in contemplation, the second however is concerned in deliberation and action, and both indeed are in the mind, but they consist in a certain different (as we said) way. Then we placed the third in the senses, and we divided it into two species, namely, natural and against nature. Of the natural ones, we call one common, the other proper. Furthermore, we say that one of the monstrous ones happens through a corrupt and wicked nature, another through vicious custom, a third through disease. Therefore, he calls the first pleasure, which arises from contemplation, divine, because it is most like God, and because it happens to us, not as men, but as gods; but that which is proper to the agent, he calls indeed honorable, yet not divine – for honorableness is not divinity itself, but a certain perfect likeness and image of divinity. Whence the second mind and pleasure degenerates from the first, because divinity is attributed to the first, but a likeness of divinity to the second. But the pleasures which affect the body can no longer be partakers of divinity, nor of honorableness, since honorableness exists as the adornment, beauty, and ornament of the mind alone, and this adornment and agreement of all parts in the habit of mind is honorableness, in affections moderation, in actions modesty, in works order, in the body form, called by most Platonists. However, those pleasures which move the senses have a certain small image of honorableness. For those which obey the laws of the mind and reason, and on that account are moderate, seem on account of this very moderation to imitate the nature of honorableness and decorum. And since they are not entirely worthy of the appellation of honorable, they are called good by the Aristotelians, and the more unrestrained and less… | 8 |
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mindique rationis participerfunt, eas ne diuinās, nec honestāt, nē denique bonās, sed vituperatione potius dignāc malas esse censet. olmque non aliud modum excefferint, ut ab hominum moribus ingenidique abhorrere penitus uideantur, nitidas quidem, humanās tamen uoluptās nominat, easque in duas distribuit partes, alias enim appetitionem duntaxat erumpere, ut qui his afficitur, appetat pro fecto præter rationem, et ducit, ne id tamen consulto efficiat, nec agendum extra perturbationes instituitus existimet, sed quodam deinde ardore libidinis excrefcat, contra id, quod recta ante mens elegerat, inclinetur, atque trahatur, eiusmodi uero incontinentis ani mi uoluptates esse putat, alias uero non modo appetitionem, verum eti am mentis iudicium deprauat, ut et contra quam decet concipiat, et id ipsum agendum bonumq; mens iudicet, consultoq; eli- gat, pro uiribus uoluptati corporis indulgere, et eas, quæ sic mentem occaecant intemperantis hominis uoluptates, esse probat. Omnes ta- men, quas hactenus in sensibus posuimus humanae uidentur. At uē- ro cum ab hominum consuetudine ingenioq; alienæ uoluptates ho- mini cuipiam, uel pessime nato, atque educato, uel morbis extra sepo- sito dominantur, quoniam bestiarum potius, quam humani ingenii proprie sint, seruiles, atque immanes appellat. Sed hæ omnes, quas sensus nobis porrigunt uoluptates, in quinque ueluti gradus, pro numero quoque sensuum ab Aristotelicis digeruntur, atque eas eundem, quem et ipsi sensus ordinem tenere censentur, uidendi uoluptas, illa, quam au- res præstant, puriora digniorq; fit, aliæq; quæ similiter aliis eodem ordi- ne puritate dignitateq; præstant. Caput.viii. Voluptates auditus, atque uisus, excellentiores sunt cæ- teris sensuū uoluptatibus. Itē de omnibus sensibus, et instrumentis eo. St autem ratio quædam optima à Platonicorum principi- bus adinuenita, qua oculorum atque aurium uoluptates, cæ- teris, quas corpus offert, omnibus præferunt, soni gppe, et hæc oculis cernunt figuræ, optima quadam atque aptissima partium coniunctio- ne conficiuntur. Id autem proportione fieri nequit, nec absque ordine est ulla proportio. Ordo autem maxime rationis est proprius, quo si ut in plerisque sonis, figurisq; ab illa compositionis ordo insit, vestigium quod- dam rationis inesse uidētur, quæ quidem rationis imago in cantuum, uocumque numeris, harmonia, in partium uero membrorumque conuenientia, pulchritudo à Platonicis nunc patur, quo efficitur, ut hæc | ON PLEASURE
and share in reason, he considers them neither divine nor honorable, nor even good, but rather deserving of censure, and bad. And if they exceed any other measure, so that they seem utterly to deviate from human customs and nature, he names them indeed refined, yet human pleasures, and divides them into two parts; for some only burst forth from appetite, so that he who is affected by them desires indeed contrary to reason, and is led by it, yet does not accomplish it deliberately, nor does he think that it is necessary to act outside of established rules, but it rather grows from a certain burning passion of lust, and is inclined and drawn against what the upright mind had previously chosen; he considers pleasures of this sort to belong to an incontinent mind; others, however, corrupt not only appetite, but also the judgment of the mind, so that it conceives contrary to what is fitting, and the mind itself judges that it is necessary and good to act, and deliberately chooses to indulge in bodily pleasure to the utmost of its ability; and these, which thus blind the mind, he approves as pleasures of an intemperate man. However, all those which we have hitherto placed in the senses seem human. But when pleasures alien to human custom and nature dominate a certain man, whether badly born and brought up, or separated from himself by illness, because they are rather of beasts than properly of human nature, he calls them servile and savage. But all these pleasures which the senses offer us are arranged by the Aristotelians into five grades, as it were, according to the number of the senses also, and they are considered to hold the same order as the senses themselves; the pleasure of sight, that which the ears afford, becomes purer and more worthy, and others which similarly excel others in purity and dignity in the same order. Chapter VIII. The pleasures of hearing and sight are superior to the pleasures of the other senses. Likewise concerning all the senses and their instruments. Now there is a certain best reason discovered by the leaders of the Platonists, by which they prefer the pleasures of the eyes and ears to all others which the body offers; for sounds and the forms which the eyes behold are accomplished by a certain best and most fitting conjunction of parts. But this cannot be done by proportion, nor is there any proportion without order. But order is most properly of reason; so if, as in most sounds and forms, that order of composition is present, a certain trace of reason seems to be present, which image of reason in the numbers of songs and voices, harmony, and in the agreement of parts and limbs, beauty is now approved by the Platonists, by which it is brought about that these... | 9 |