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Chapter VIII—How the Peripatetics divide pleasure, and concerning two principles. | Chapter VIII—How the Peripatetics divide pleasure, and concerning two principles. | ||
9. Therefore, I think it has been sufficiently shown how the Platonists and Peripatetics have handed down the definition of pleasure, and how the arguments of both agree on the same thing. However, let us explain what the Peripatetics thought about the division of pleasure. All Peripatetics think that human nature consists of soul and body. They divide the soul, however, into two parts, insofar as it pertains to the proposed question, namely, mind and sense. And again, they say the mind has a twofold power and nature. Of these, one indeed is occupied with the investigation of truth, the other with deliberation and action, and they call the former (to use their words) the contemplative intellect, the latter the active. The property of the former is to seek out the causes, properties, and progress of those things which are contained in the order of nature. And it is content only with the contemplation of truth. But they say the work of the latter is, by deliberation, to discern what should be done or avoided. They call certain senses internal, others external. The internal (as Averroes, the most acute of the interpreters of the Peripatetics, wishes), they divide into four species, of which the first collects and perceives all the images which are drawn in through the five external senses, and on this account they call it the common sense. Then a second power of imagining is called by them, whose office it is, since it itself fashions nothing by itself, to retain the images which have been received from the prior senses, and to bring them to a third nature of feeling, which they call imagination, the power of thinking and considering, whose work they judge to be that, having received these images, it judges and perceives what or of what kind that is of which those images are, and it commits to the keeping of the last part of the brain itself and of the sense, which they call memory, those things which it has separated or joined together, or conceived by judging. The external senses however... | 9. Therefore, I think it has been sufficiently shown how the Platonists and Peripatetics have handed down the definition of pleasure, and how the arguments of both agree on the same thing. However, let us explain what the Peripatetics thought about the division of pleasure. All Peripatetics think that human nature consists of soul and body. They divide the soul, however, into two parts, insofar as it pertains to the proposed question, namely, mind and sense. And again, they say the mind has a twofold power and nature. Of these, one indeed is occupied with the investigation of truth, the other with deliberation and action, and they call the former (to use their words) the contemplative intellect, the latter the active. The property of the former is to seek out the causes, properties, and progress of those things which are contained in the order of nature. And it is content only with the contemplation of truth. But they say the work of the latter is, by deliberation, to discern what should be done or avoided. They call certain senses internal, others external. The internal (as Averroes, the most acute of the interpreters of the Peripatetics, wishes), they divide into four species, of which the first collects and perceives all the images which are drawn in through the five external senses, and on this account they call it the common sense. Then a second power of imagining is called by them, whose office it is, since it itself fashions nothing by itself, to retain the images which have been received from the prior senses, and to bring them to a third nature of feeling, which they call imagination, the power of thinking and considering, whose work they judge to be that, having received these images, it judges and perceives what or of what kind that is of which those images are, and it commits to the keeping of the last part of the brain itself and of the sense, which they call memory, those things which it has separated or joined together, or conceived by judging. The external senses however... | ||
|Pagenumber=4 | |||
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Revision as of 13:41, 26 June 2025
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Uuid | 6bd2d39b-ed02-5f7e-3269-afe3e89f13FAKEUUID |
| ItemId | 674057212677591a7c897d60 |
| PageId | 674057342677591a7c897d68 |
| Author | Iamblichus |
| Title | De Mysteriis |
| Pagenumber | 4 |
Original Page:
Latin:
LIBER quiefcit Quapropter Aurelius Augustinus voluptate definit appe- titionis ipfius cum eo, quod amauerit unionem. Non ne & hoc idem pe- ripatetici voluptate fuperius definire, requiefcere animum, per- fundi, ac penitus copulari. Quid ergo restat, cur non dicantur Plato- nici, peripateticique unum, atque idem de voluptate, & dicere pariter, & sentire? Quo alio discrepant, nisi illi consentire animum, isti quie- scere, ac silere dicunt. Immo & ob hoc nihilo discrepant; necenim quie- scit animus unquam, nisi consentiat, nec consentit quidem, nisi pariter & quiescat. Caput viii-Quomo peripatetici dividunt voluptate, & de duobus aiz. 9 Vid ergo Platonici ac peripatetici de voluptatis definitione ne tradiderint, & quemadmodum in idem utrorumque di- sputationes conveniant, fatis iam arbitror declaratum. Quod uero de voluptatis divisione peripatetici senserint exequamur. Om- nem peripatetici naturam hominis ex anima constare putant, & cor- pore. Animam vero in duas partes, ut ad propositam questionem perti- net, mentem uidelicet, sensumque distribui. Rursusque mentem vim pariter geminam, naturamque habere. Earum profecto unam in verita- tis indagatione, alteram in consultatione, & actione versari, atque illum (uteorum verbis utar) contemplativum intellectum, hunc activum no- minant. Illius proprium esse rerum earum, quae naturae ordine conti- nentur, causas, proprietates, progressusque perquirere. Solaque veritatis contemplatione contentum esse. Huius autem opus dici volunt, quae agenda, fugienda velint, consulando discernere. Sensium vero alios quidem intimos, externos alios vocant. Intimos (ut vult Averroes peripa- teticorum interpretum acutissimus) quatuor in species dividunt, quo- rum primus omnes, quae per externos quinque sensus hauriuntur ima- gines colligat, atque percipiat, ob idque communem sensum appellant. Al- tera deinde vis imaginandi ab iis nuncupata est, cuius officium sit, cum ipse nihil per se fingat imagines, quae a prioribus sensibus acceptae sunt, retinere, easque tertiae sentiendi naturae, cui illi phantasiam, existiman- dique, ac cogitandi vim dicunt, afferre, cuius opus esse arbitrantur, ut iis acceptis imaginibus, quid aut quale sit id cuius illae imagines sint, iudicet, atque percipiat, eaque ipsa, quae discreverit, sive conjunxerit, seu concepta judicando, postremam cerebri ipsius, sensusque particulae, quam memoriam dicunt, servanda commendat. Sensus vero illos ex- ternos
English:
BOOK It rests. Therefore, Augustine defines pleasure as the union with that which one has loved. Do not the Peripatetics also define pleasure similarly above, as the quieting of the mind, its being filled, and thoroughly united? What then remains, why are not the Platonists and Peripatetics said to be one and the same concerning pleasure, and to say and feel alike? In what else do they differ, except that those say the mind consents, these that it rests and is silent? Indeed, on this account they do not differ at all; for the mind never rests unless it consents, nor does it consent unless it also rests.
Chapter VIII—How the Peripatetics divide pleasure, and concerning two principles. 9. Therefore, I think it has been sufficiently shown how the Platonists and Peripatetics have handed down the definition of pleasure, and how the arguments of both agree on the same thing. However, let us explain what the Peripatetics thought about the division of pleasure. All Peripatetics think that human nature consists of soul and body. They divide the soul, however, into two parts, insofar as it pertains to the proposed question, namely, mind and sense. And again, they say the mind has a twofold power and nature. Of these, one indeed is occupied with the investigation of truth, the other with deliberation and action, and they call the former (to use their words) the contemplative intellect, the latter the active. The property of the former is to seek out the causes, properties, and progress of those things which are contained in the order of nature. And it is content only with the contemplation of truth. But they say the work of the latter is, by deliberation, to discern what should be done or avoided. They call certain senses internal, others external. The internal (as Averroes, the most acute of the interpreters of the Peripatetics, wishes), they divide into four species, of which the first collects and perceives all the images which are drawn in through the five external senses, and on this account they call it the common sense. Then a second power of imagining is called by them, whose office it is, since it itself fashions nothing by itself, to retain the images which have been received from the prior senses, and to bring them to a third nature of feeling, which they call imagination, the power of thinking and considering, whose work they judge to be that, having received these images, it judges and perceives what or of what kind that is of which those images are, and it commits to the keeping of the last part of the brain itself and of the sense, which they call memory, those things which it has separated or joined together, or conceived by judging. The external senses however...