6740572f2677591a7c897d64
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Uuid | 6bd2d39b-ed02-5f7e-3269-afe3e89f13FAKEUUID |
| ItemId | 674057212677591a7c897d60 |
| PageId | 6740572f2677591a7c897d64 |
| Author | Iamblichus |
| Title | De Mysteriis |
| Pagenumber | 2 |
Original Page:
Latin:
LIBER expofuerunt. Aliinanque ceffationem ipfam, acueluti finem aliquem appetendi quietem definiunt. Appetitum et enim cum id,quod cupie rat bonum adeptus fuerit, ab appetendo defiftere.Itaque follicitudine et anxietate uacare, quæ uacatio quies ipfa fit, eademque uoluptasab Arifto tele nuncupata Ideoque uoluptas eft, ut ifti definiút, acquifito, quod cu pitum fuerat bono, ab omni appetendi follicitudine et anxietate uaca tio. Non nulli uero peripatetici aliquid huic uacationi aliud ad- diderunt.Carere quippe omni moleftia non dum plenam, ac perfectă uoluptatis naturam poflidere Fieri uero integram, atque abfolutam fi in eo ipfo ftatu ficomnisappetitio conquiefcat, ut non modo non ulte rius appetat quippiam, fed huic,quo fruitur bono totis neruis, ac uiri bushæreat, affentiatur fibi effe fatis,atque í id penitus diffundatur Efter igo, ut cenfent ifti, uoluptas affenfio, atque diffufio appetitus in id, quod poffideatbonum, quo fitut mediisin uoluptatibus liquefcere corpusto tum,ac diffuere uideatur. cum omnis animi, corporífq; uis, ac motus in id, quod extrinfecusobiicitur,inclinetur, ac penitusrapiatur. Eiufce- modi uero diffufio non modo in corporismembris partibufque.uerú etiam in appetitu naturaque animi efle debet neque enim i rem aliquă corpus nifi appetitus i pulfu animique poteftate diffunditur Quapro- pter etipfum quoque appetitum animumque diffundi necefle eft,atq; auidiflime affigi,et hærere illi, quod propriæ uideatur naturæ cógruere. Omnisigitur huiufmodi animi, appetituſquenixus,copulandı,hærédi affigendi ei, quod iam poffidetur bono uoluptatem continet, nec aliud quicquam, ut illis placer, uoluptaseffe uidetur, nifi aflentiri, hærere, affi gipræfenti bono, o,in id que difluere, penituſque diffundi-modo hæcin- telligasin animo,in eaque animi parte, quæappetendi iuis nominata eft fieri-Nam huiufmodi motus in calore quoque fanguine, ſpiritibus, to toque corpore reperitur, qui nec tamen uoluptaseft, nec parsaliqua uo luptatis.uerum ab ea,quæ in animo eft diffufione, affenfioneque, quam uoluptatem dicuntalla quoque corporis liquefactio, effufioque ueluti ueftigia quædam intima uoluptatis proficifcunt.Ná qualia hæcin cor pore funt,talis et in animo uoluptas exiftit. Caput.vii.Que platonicorum cum ariftotelicis concordia, et quid Pla to de fenfibus, et affectibus, Aec eftigitur peripateticorum de uoluptatis definitióe fen- tentia, quam ipfearbitror, ne minima quidem in partea Pla- tonis
English:
They have expounded. And they define that very cessation, as it were, some end of appeasing quiet. For appetite also, when it has obtained the good thing which it desired, ceases from desiring. Therefore, to be free from solicitude and anxiety, which freedom is quiet itself, and the same pleasure called by Aristotle. Therefore, pleasure is, as they define it, freedom from all the solicitude and anxiety of desiring, when the good thing which was desired has been acquired. However, some Peripatetics added something else to this freedom. For to be free from all trouble does not yet possess the full and perfect nature of pleasure. However, it becomes whole and complete if in that very state all appetite rests, so that not only does it not further desire anything, but it clings to this good which it enjoys with all its strength and power, agrees that it is enough for itself, and this is thoroughly diffused. Therefore, as these people think, pleasure is the agreement and diffusion of appetite in the good which it possesses, so that the body seems to melt and diffuse itself as a mediator in pleasures, when all the force and motion of mind and body is inclined and thoroughly carried away to that which is presented from without. Such diffusion, however, ought to be not only in the members and parts of the body, but also in the nature of appetite and mind; for the body is not diffused into some thing except by the power of appetite and mind's impulse. Wherefore, it is necessary that appetite and mind themselves also be diffused, and most eagerly fixed and adhere to that which seems to agree with its own nature. Therefore, all such striving, coupling, adhering, and fixing of mind and appetite to the good which is already possessed contains pleasure, and nothing else seems to be pleasure to them, except to agree, adhere, and be fixed to the present good, and to flow into it and be thoroughly diffused—only let this be understood to take place in the mind, and in that part of the mind which is called the faculty of appetite. For such motion is found also in warm blood, spirits, and the whole body, which is nevertheless not pleasure, nor a part of pleasure; but from that diffusion and agreement which is in the mind, which they call pleasure, all the liquefaction and effusion of the body proceeds as certain intimate traces of pleasure. For as these things are in the body, so pleasure exists in the mind.
Chapter VII. What concord of the Platonists with the Aristotelians, and what Plato says about senses and affections.
This, therefore, is the opinion of the Peripatetics concerning the definition of pleasure, which I myself believe does not differ in the slightest part from Plato's.