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6
ON PLEASURE
They judged fecundation and titillation to be pleasure.
Chapter I. The opinions of the Peripatetics on pleasure.
Aristotle, however, does not seem to call any of these things pleasure. Furthermore, he considers a certain perfection of apprehension itself, such that a perception of sweetness comes first, and from this something else arises as its companion and annexed perfection, and this same thing is pleasure. What this kind of perfection is, which he names pleasure, he never (it seems) explained. The Peripatetics, however, who flowed from Aristotle, while wishing to explain what had been obscurely said by their leader and to bring it to light, were distributed into various opinions. For some placed pleasure in the senses, others in that which follows the senses, namely appetite. And those who placed it in the senses also interpreted Aristotle in different ways. For some think that there are two perceptions in the senses, of which the first seems somehow to proceed and flow from those things which are offered from without into the mind; the other, however, proceeds more from the mind, and extends to those things which are outside. For first, for example, the mind perceives sweetness, which first perception seems to arise from the sweetness of the thing itself which is presented. Then it considers that it has obtained sweetness, that it perceives it, possesses it, and enjoys it; and this second perception, or thought, or meditation, or consideration of the mind, they judged to have been called pleasure by Aristotle, so that pleasure is that very consideration by which one thinks that one enjoys the presence of good things. Some do not think it is the sense, when it perceives that sweetness is obtained, and as it were is raised up and conceives a certain kind of joy, and bears it of itself, and they think that this was called pleasure by Aristotle. Therefore pleasure is an elevation, or joy of mind having already obtained that good which it desired. But those who placed pleasure in that part of the mind by which we desire, think that there are two properties of appetite. One is that we are moved and inclined towards those good things which are far from us, and we have not yet obtained them; the other consists in that which we have already obtained. They call the first desire, the second rest; and they say that the former is full of trouble, anxiety, care, and worry; but the latter is infused with an ineffable sweetness, and they say that this was called pleasure by the leader of the Peripatetics, so that pleasure was nothing other than a certain end, or rest of appetite in a good which has already been obtained. Whence Lucretius says, "Rest," he says, "is the pleasure of men and gods." But what rest itself is, not all agree in the same way...
They have expounded. And they define that very cessation, as it were, some end of appeasing quiet. For appetite also, when it has obtained the good thing which it desired, ceases from desiring. Therefore, to be free from solicitude and anxiety, which freedom is quiet itself, and the same pleasure called by Aristotle. Therefore, pleasure is, as they define it, freedom from all the solicitude and anxiety of desiring, when the good thing which was desired has been acquired. However, some Peripatetics added something else to this freedom. For to be free from all trouble does not yet possess the full and perfect nature of pleasure. However, it becomes whole and complete if in that very state all appetite rests, so that not only does it not further desire anything, but it clings to this good which it enjoys with all its strength and power, agrees that it is enough for itself, and this is thoroughly diffused. Therefore, as these people think, pleasure is the agreement and diffusion of appetite in the good which it possesses, so that the body seems to melt and diffuse itself as a mediator in pleasures, when all the force and motion of mind and body is inclined and thoroughly carried away to that which is presented from without. Such diffusion, however, ought to be not only in the members and parts of the body, but also in the nature of appetite and mind; for the body is not diffused into some thing except by the power of appetite and mind's impulse. Wherefore, it is necessary that appetite and mind themselves also be diffused, and most eagerly fixed and adhere to that which seems to agree with its own nature. Therefore, all such striving, coupling, adhering, and fixing of mind and appetite to the good which is already possessed contains pleasure, and nothing else seems to be pleasure to them, except to agree, adhere, and be fixed to the present good, and to flow into it and be thoroughly diffused—only let this be understood to take place in the mind, and in that part of the mind which is called the faculty of appetite. For such motion is found also in warm blood, spirits, and the whole body, which is nevertheless not pleasure, nor a part of pleasure; but from that diffusion and agreement which is in the mind, which they call pleasure, all the liquefaction and effusion of the body proceeds as certain intimate traces of pleasure. For as these things are in the body, so pleasure exists in the mind.
Chapter VII. What concord of the Platonists with the Aristotelians, and what Plato says about senses and affections.
This, therefore, is the opinion of the Peripatetics concerning the definition of pleasure, which I myself believe does not differ in the slightest part from Plato's.
ON PLEASURE
Our opinion differs from that of Aristotle, except that Aristotle speaks more broadly with the same name of pleasure, naming both the pleasure that is in the mind and that which is in the senses. Plato, however, calls pleasure that which happens to the senses. What is in the mind he calls joy. Indeed, sometimes Plato himself confuses the names of pleasure and joy, using both words to signify both. Therefore, they differ in name either not at all, or hardly at all, and minimally; in reality, however, several of Plato's books, and also many Platonists not at all to be despised philosophically, can be witnesses to their agreement. For Apuleius, Chalcidius, and Contius, notable Platonists of Ptolemy, interpret Plato's most obscurely stated opinion in the *Timaeus* in the way I shall briefly relate. They say, in fact, that by Plato the first perception of the mind is understood, which arises from the very passion of the body. And indeed, they say that species of all things which are to be known flow to us, are drawn in through the openings of the senses, are imprinted upon and fixed in the spirit which is in the ventricles of the brain. These kinds of species of things, figured in the spirit, which is indeed a most thin and transparent body, attract the mind and cause it to gaze upon and perceive those very external objects of which these are images. We see this perception of the mind arising from the very impulse and passion of the body; for the spirit itself, moved by external bodies, strikes the mind similarly and shapes it into an image. Therefore, since such perception arises from the impulse of the spirit, it follows that it proceeds from the passion, impulse, and motion of the body, which the good Platonist Aurelius Augustine imitated in that book which is written *On the Quantity of the Soul*. “Sensation,” he says, “is the passion of the body itself unwillingly affecting the soul; therefore, by the very species of the body drawn in by the senses, it perceives the same passion of the body also, by a certain first and proper image.” From which it happens that we feel a twofold passion of the body. For we apprehend the impulses of the brain and spirit, passions of external bodies. This passion, however, which the body itself receives from without, the Platonists divide into two kinds: one softens and soothes the body, and yet does not strike, touch, or tickle the limbs and viscera; the other, however, moves more harshly and roughly. When the mind agrees with that first motion of the body, whose property it is to soothe, pleasure is produced. When it recoils and shrinks from the other, which we call harsh, it produces pain. The mind, however, agrees with the motion of the body when it willingly adheres to it, is fixed to it, is joined to it, and is most sweetly poured into it.
BOOK
It rests. Therefore, Augustine defines pleasure as the union with that which one has loved. Do not the Peripatetics also define pleasure similarly above, as the quieting of the mind, its being filled, and thoroughly united? What then remains, why are not the Platonists and Peripatetics said to be one and the same concerning pleasure, and to say and feel alike? In what else do they differ, except that those say the mind consents, these that it rests and is silent? Indeed, on this account they do not differ at all; for the mind never rests unless it consents, nor does it consent unless it also rests.
Chapter VIII—How the Peripatetics divide pleasure, and concerning two principles.
9. Therefore, I think it has been sufficiently shown how the Platonists and Peripatetics have handed down the definition of pleasure, and how the arguments of both agree on the same thing. However, let us explain what the Peripatetics thought about the division of pleasure. All Peripatetics think that human nature consists of soul and body. They divide the soul, however, into two parts, insofar as it pertains to the proposed question, namely, mind and sense. And again, they say the mind has a twofold power and nature. Of these, one indeed is occupied with the investigation of truth, the other with deliberation and action, and they call the former (to use their words) the contemplative intellect, the latter the active. The property of the former is to seek out the causes, properties, and progress of those things which are contained in the order of nature. And it is content only with the contemplation of truth. But they say the work of the latter is, by deliberation, to discern what should be done or avoided. They call certain senses internal, others external. The internal (as Averroes, the most acute of the interpreters of the Peripatetics, wishes), they divide into four species, of which the first collects and perceives all the images which are drawn in through the five external senses, and on this account they call it the common sense. Then a second power of imagining is called by them, whose office it is, since it itself fashions nothing by itself, to retain the images which have been received from the prior senses, and to bring them to a third nature of feeling, which they call imagination, the power of thinking and considering, whose work they judge to be that, having received these images, it judges and perceives what or of what kind that is of which those images are, and it commits to the keeping of the last part of the brain itself and of the sense, which they call memory, those things which it has separated or joined together, or conceived by judging. The external senses however...
Concerning Pleasure
Those who are more capable of understanding what we seek divide it into five categories, which are known to all, and they maintain that these are related to each other in such a way that those which occupy a more prominent place in the body are purer and simpler. The others are coarser. Therefore, sight is considered purer than hearing, hearing than smell, smell than taste, and taste than touch. For light and colors pertain to sight, sounds to hearing, odors to the nose. Flavors pertain to taste, solidity and softness, warmth and cold pertain to the sense of touch. Therefore, light and color surpass sound, sound surpasses odors, and these in turn surpass flavor. Flavors, however, surpass those things which are subject to touch, just as sight surpasses hearing, and hearing surpasses the sense of smell. Sight surpasses taste, and taste surpasses touch in purity and dignity. To these five powers of sensation, five corresponding organs and underlying structures, and as it were, certain foundations are attributed in the body (as they call it). Nor do these seem to be anything other than certain affections of the body, which some call dispositions, others qualities, and some complexions, which arise from a varied mixture of elements in different parts of the body, and are also the foundations of different senses. For one affection of the body is that by which the power of seeing is sustained and thrives. Another is that by which the power of hearing is sustained, and the same judgment must be made of all the rest besides these five affections or underlying structures. Five instruments, and stronger members of the body, to which both senses and affections themselves adhere, as it were certain receptacles invented and established, are equally present. For the eyes, like little vessels, receive the affection and power of sight, and the other members of the body, as is clear, are assigned to other qualities and senses in a certain order. Furthermore, these members and instruments have certain innate motions which seem to demonstrate the intimate affection of each. And so, in the very disturbances of the mind, we see people sometimes blush, sometimes turn pale, and sometimes contract and stiffen, while at other times they relax and, as it were, liquefy.
Aristotle believes that all the things we have enumerated in a long list hold to pleasure in this way: that in what he calls the contemplative mind, a certain perfect and absolute pleasure resides. Then, it gradually degenerates in the other parts of man. For (as he thinks) of the seven causes, that first pleasure, and the second which is placed in the active mind, seems to be more perfect pleasure. For every pleasure which arises from truth…
Pleasure derived from contemplation is honest and most praiseworthy. However, when the mind deliberates about things to be done or avoided, and takes pleasure in the choice of such things, not all such pleasure is usually praised. That which arises from those plans and actions which oppose the best things is rightly blamed, as if the mind rejoices in a plan against the safety of one's country and parents, and against right. When it delights in honest actions, the pleasure is honest; but when in mediocre actions, the pleasure too is mediocre. Therefore, there is only one kind of joy, and that is worthy of praise. In the other, however, there are three kinds (as we have said): the honest, the shameful, and the mediocre. That argument which he uses in the tenth book on morals is also quite relevant to what we are discussing. For he says that we can contemplate longer than we can do anything else, and since the investigation of truth is firmer and more stable than any duty of action, it is necessary that the pleasure which arises from it should also be more stable and perfect. Add to this that the life of the wise man and contemplation requires fewer things than civic life; wherefore, since its pleasure is content with few and small things, it will undoubtedly be more self-sufficient and more perfect. Furthermore, that part of the mind to which we attribute contemplation is, as no one would deny, more perfect, and therefore brings a more excellent pleasure than all others. And while the active movements and agitations of the mind are directed toward something else to be chosen or rejected, the contemplation of the primary mind is content with itself, and desires nothing at all besides itself. Therefore, by necessary reasoning, the pleasure which is proper to contemplation is desired for its own sake alone. The other, however, seeks something besides itself as an end, and therefore the former is to be judged much more excellent. Added to this is the fact that the first and more perfect part of anything bears the name and function of the whole; from which it follows that since each of us is constituted of many parts, yet that which is assigned to contemplation, because it surpasses the others in dignity, almost encompasses the whole nature of man, and that is what man is, as Aristotle says; wherefore, its action is especially appropriate for us, and contains an inexpressible pleasure, for things more naturally related tend to bring greater pleasure. Last...
Aristotle's final argument proves that the proper activity of the immortal gods consists solely in contemplation; and therefore, it seems that in us there is nothing besides the first (as we have said) mind and contemplation, and the pleasure arising from it, which is akin to God. If this kind of pleasure, because it alone is fitting for the immortals, is supremely divine, it will rightly be judged superior to all other pleasures. Therefore, Aristotle used these arguments to place the pleasure of contemplation above that which is perceived through action. But let us now turn to those pleasures which, as it were, tickle the senses and flow into and penetrate them with a certain sweetness. We find these divided by Aristotle into two kinds, of which some seem to be natural, others contrary to nature. He calls those natural which, because they restore nature, are desired by all or most, and he divides these in two ways into equal numbers. Some are common to all animals, others are somehow proper and related to individuals according to the diversity of nature. For the fact that all things desire food, drink, and the use of Venus is the property of a common and natural desire and pleasure; but that individual things delight in various things according to the diversity of nature, and that some things are more pleasing to some than to others, pertains to a natural, yet proper pleasure. For since that pleasure seems suitable to each thing which accords with its nature, and since the affections and natures of different animals are diverse, it is necessary that those things which are suitable to different animals should also differ. And therefore, a certain and, as it were, proper desire and pleasure belongs to individual animals (as Heraclitus says). For each thing delights in that which is suited to its nature; each thing is drawn by its own pleasure. And these are what he calls natural. He believes, however, that those are contrary to nature from which almost the whole human race recoils, and he divides these into three kinds. For some result from a certain wicked and corrupt nature, others from the worst habit, and some from diseases and adverse circumstances. Aristotle writes that perversity of nature has also occurred, such as a certain woman striving eagerly to tear out the entrails of pregnant women and devour children, or what is reported about certain savage tribes around the Pontus. For some delight in raw flesh, others in human flesh, and some hand over their newborns to be eaten at feasts. The Troglodytes, however, are said to feed on serpents. Also, through long habit it happens to many that they are pleased by pulling out hairs or eating nails.
BOOK
Let them delight. Often also, either by diseases of the mind or body, it happens that he who sacrificed his mother, and ate her, and he who boiled his daughter and her parts in order to eat both, and who ardently desired to devour his attendant, and having killed him devoured him with the greatest pleasure. We also have seen those affected by a certain bodily disease, some indeed crave pebbles, others gypsum, some earth, some charcoal, others lime, as often happens to pregnant women, who crave teeth most eagerly. He considers these three unnatural kinds of pleasure to be not of human but of savage and brutal nature, whence such pleasures are called monstrous in the seventh book, which is inscribed on morals. From those which we have enumerated so far, there seem to be three kinds of pleasure in Aristotle. The first indeed is in contemplation, the second however is concerned in deliberation and action, and both indeed are in the mind, but they consist in a certain different (as we said) way. Then we placed the third in the senses, and we divided it into two species, namely, natural and against nature. Of the natural ones, we call one common, the other proper. Furthermore, we say that one of the monstrous ones happens through a corrupt and wicked nature, another through vicious custom, a third through disease. Therefore, he calls the first pleasure, which arises from contemplation, divine, because it is most like God, and because it happens to us, not as men, but as gods; but that which is proper to the agent, he calls indeed honorable, yet not divine – for honorableness is not divinity itself, but a certain perfect likeness and image of divinity. Whence the second mind and pleasure degenerates from the first, because divinity is attributed to the first, but a likeness of divinity to the second. But the pleasures which affect the body can no longer be partakers of divinity, nor of honorableness, since honorableness exists as the adornment, beauty, and ornament of the mind alone, and this adornment and agreement of all parts in the habit of mind is honorableness, in affections moderation, in actions modesty, in works order, in the body form, called by most Platonists. However, those pleasures which move the senses have a certain small image of honorableness. For those which obey the laws of the mind and reason, and on that account are moderate, seem on account of this very moderation to imitate the nature of honorableness and decorum. And since they are not entirely worthy of the appellation of honorable, they are called good by the Aristotelians, and the more unrestrained and less…
ON PLEASURE
and share in reason, he considers them neither divine nor honorable, nor even good, but rather deserving of censure, and bad. And if they exceed any other measure, so that they seem utterly to deviate from human customs and nature, he names them indeed refined, yet human pleasures, and divides them into two parts; for some only burst forth from appetite, so that he who is affected by them desires indeed contrary to reason, and is led by it, yet does not accomplish it deliberately, nor does he think that it is necessary to act outside of established rules, but it rather grows from a certain burning passion of lust, and is inclined and drawn against what the upright mind had previously chosen; he considers pleasures of this sort to belong to an incontinent mind; others, however, corrupt not only appetite, but also the judgment of the mind, so that it conceives contrary to what is fitting, and the mind itself judges that it is necessary and good to act, and deliberately chooses to indulge in bodily pleasure to the utmost of its ability; and these, which thus blind the mind, he approves as pleasures of an intemperate man. However, all those which we have hitherto placed in the senses seem human. But when pleasures alien to human custom and nature dominate a certain man, whether badly born and brought up, or separated from himself by illness, because they are rather of beasts than properly of human nature, he calls them servile and savage. But all these pleasures which the senses offer us are arranged by the Aristotelians into five grades, as it were, according to the number of the senses also, and they are considered to hold the same order as the senses themselves; the pleasure of sight, that which the ears afford, becomes purer and more worthy, and others which similarly excel others in purity and dignity in the same order.
Chapter VIII. The pleasures of hearing and sight are superior to the pleasures of the other senses. Likewise concerning all the senses and their instruments. Now there is a certain best reason discovered by the leaders of the Platonists, by which they prefer the pleasures of the eyes and ears to all others which the body offers; for sounds and the forms which the eyes behold are accomplished by a certain best and most fitting conjunction of parts. But this cannot be done by proportion, nor is there any proportion without order. But order is most properly of reason; so if, as in most sounds and forms, that order of composition is present, a certain trace of reason seems to be present, which image of reason in the numbers of songs and voices, harmony, and in the agreement of parts and limbs, beauty is now approved by the Platonists, by which it is brought about that these...