674057322677591a7c897d66
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Uuid | 6bd2d39b-ed02-5f7e-3269-afe3e89f13FAKEUUID |
| ItemId | 674057212677591a7c897d60 |
| PageId | 674057322677591a7c897d66 |
| Author | Iamblichus |
| Title | De Mysteriis |
| Pagenumber | 3 |
Original Page:
Latin:
DE VOLUPTATE tonis nostri sententia discrepare, nisi quod Aristoteles latius loquitur eodem nomine voluptatis, et eam, quae in mente est, iocunditatem,et eam quae in sensibus nominans. Plato vero voluptatem vocat eam, quae sensibus accidit.quod vero in mente est, id gaudium nuncupat. Quinetiam interdum et ipse Plato voluptatis et gaudii nomina confundit, utroque vocabulo utens ad utrunque significandum. Nomine igitur vel nullo modo, vel vix, ac minimo discrepant, ex vero re congruunt testes esse possunt non nulli Platonis libri, nec non Platonici plerique haudquaquam philosophica contemnendi. Nam Apuleius, Calcidius, Contius, Ptolemaei Platonici nobiles eo, quem breuiter referam, modo Platonis sententiam obscurissimam in Timco verbis positam, interpretantur. sensum profecto aiunt a Platone primam animi perceptionem, quae ab ipsa corporis passione nascatur, intelligi. Et enim rerum omnium, quae noscendae sunt, species quasdam ad nos fluere, sensuum foraminibus hauriri in eo, qui in cerebri ventriculis est, spiritu imprimi, atque consignari. eiusmodi rerum species in spiritu, quod quidem corpus est tenuissumum, atque perlucidum figuratas pullare animum, atque efficere, ut illa ipsa obiecta externa, quorum hae sunt imagines intuetur, atque percipiat. hanc animi perceptionem ab ipsa corporis passione impulsionesque nasci uidemus spiritus siquidem ab externis motis corporibus, ipse animum simili pulsat, formatque imagine. Cum igitur eiusmodi perceptio a spiritus impulsione nascatur, consequens est eam a corporis passione, idet pulsu motioneque proficisci, quod imitatus Aurelius Augustinus Platonicus bonus in eo libro, qui de animi quantitate scribitur. sensus est, inquit, passio corporis per se ipsam nolens animam, idet per ipsam corporis speciem sensibus haustem eiusdem quoque passionem corporis, prima quadam, et propria imagine percipi. Ex quibus fit, ut gemina corporis passione sentiamus. Nam cerebri spirituque impulsionem externorum corporum passiones apprehe dimus. Passionem vero illam, quam corpus proprium extrinsecus accepit, Platonici bifariam dividunt, quarum una leniat corpus, ac mulceat, nec tamen membra, visceraque pulset, quam palpet, atque titillet altera vero asperius, ac durius agitet. Cum vero animus primae illi corporis motioni, cuius mulcere proprium est, consentiat, voluptatem fieri. cum ab altera, quam asperam dicimus, abhorreat, atque defciscat, dolorem afferunt. Assentitur autem animus corporis motioni, cum ei libenter adhaeret, affigitur, copulatur, perfunditurque in ea suavissime con
English:
ON PLEASURE
Our opinion differs from that of Aristotle, except that Aristotle speaks more broadly with the same name of pleasure, naming both the pleasure that is in the mind and that which is in the senses. Plato, however, calls pleasure that which happens to the senses. What is in the mind he calls joy. Indeed, sometimes Plato himself confuses the names of pleasure and joy, using both words to signify both. Therefore, they differ in name either not at all, or hardly at all, and minimally; in reality, however, several of Plato's books, and also many Platonists not at all to be despised philosophically, can be witnesses to their agreement. For Apuleius, Chalcidius, and Contius, notable Platonists of Ptolemy, interpret Plato's most obscurely stated opinion in the *Timaeus* in the way I shall briefly relate. They say, in fact, that by Plato the first perception of the mind is understood, which arises from the very passion of the body. And indeed, they say that species of all things which are to be known flow to us, are drawn in through the openings of the senses, are imprinted upon and fixed in the spirit which is in the ventricles of the brain. These kinds of species of things, figured in the spirit, which is indeed a most thin and transparent body, attract the mind and cause it to gaze upon and perceive those very external objects of which these are images. We see this perception of the mind arising from the very impulse and passion of the body; for the spirit itself, moved by external bodies, strikes the mind similarly and shapes it into an image. Therefore, since such perception arises from the impulse of the spirit, it follows that it proceeds from the passion, impulse, and motion of the body, which the good Platonist Aurelius Augustine imitated in that book which is written *On the Quantity of the Soul*. “Sensation,” he says, “is the passion of the body itself unwillingly affecting the soul; therefore, by the very species of the body drawn in by the senses, it perceives the same passion of the body also, by a certain first and proper image.” From which it happens that we feel a twofold passion of the body. For we apprehend the impulses of the brain and spirit, passions of external bodies. This passion, however, which the body itself receives from without, the Platonists divide into two kinds: one softens and soothes the body, and yet does not strike, touch, or tickle the limbs and viscera; the other, however, moves more harshly and roughly. When the mind agrees with that first motion of the body, whose property it is to soothe, pleasure is produced. When it recoils and shrinks from the other, which we call harsh, it produces pain. The mind, however, agrees with the motion of the body when it willingly adheres to it, is fixed to it, is joined to it, and is most sweetly poured into it.